tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21863552.post116487465088460971..comments2023-11-25T01:52:56.999-08:00Comments on Philosophical Pontifications: A Doxastic Analogue of Curry's ParadoxAnonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06892913480992228908noreply@blogger.comBlogger1125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21863552.post-40424743808831742512008-07-31T13:23:00.000-07:002008-07-31T13:23:00.000-07:00What?The following term has no referent: "the prop...What?<BR/><BR/>The following term has no referent: "the proposition expressed by (1*)" in:<BR/><BR/>(1*) if Curry believes the proposition expressed by (1*), then Curry believes all propositions<BR/><BR/>it has no referent, because no proposition refers to itself.<BR/><BR/>Thus (1*) expresses no proposition.<BR/><BR/>Let Q be a quantified expression, in the sense of generalized quantifiers; then Q does not quantify over Q's intension (Frege's 'Sinn'). If 's(Q)' denotes Q's Sinn and 'x(Q)' denotes the universe of discourse over which Q's quantifiers range, we can state:<BR/><BR/>(Q) ~s(Q) e x(Q)<BR/><BR/>where 'e' is the set membership relation.<BR/><BR/>I'd say that (Q), when properly used, disposes of this and other paradoxes.<BR/><BR/>Best.Nueva Argentinahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12219856503592516619noreply@blogger.com