tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21863552.post60253611291044304..comments2023-11-25T01:52:56.999-08:00Comments on Philosophical Pontifications: Are options the same as alternative possibilities?Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06892913480992228908noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21863552.post-39526953540450410512009-02-14T01:44:00.000-08:002009-02-14T01:44:00.000-08:00Hi Jon,Yeah, the idea behind my example is similar...Hi Jon,<BR/><BR/>Yeah, the idea behind my example is similar to Dennett's account. <BR/><BR/>While a compatibilist might describe their position either by saying that free will is compatible with determinism or by saying that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism, I think the second is a better way of putting it. To me the term 'free will' does seem to suggest that free agents have the ability to do otherwise, while 'moral responsibility' does not. But that's just me. :-pAnonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06892913480992228908noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21863552.post-88549178010836504262009-02-10T20:46:00.000-08:002009-02-10T20:46:00.000-08:00Hey that was interesting, kind of reminds of some ...Hey that was interesting, kind of reminds of some of the stuff in Asta's Metaphysics class. I think it was Daniel Dennett? It seems like you're hinting at two different kinds of free wills here, the traditional and the one revised by Dennett. That is, x is free if and only if x can do otherwise. However, Dennett says that x is free even if one cannot do otherwise. haha<BR/><BR/>It's understood that the agent chose c, and cannot choose a, b, or d. Yet, the agent remains to have free will. <BR/><BR/>I don't know if these are along the same lines as your argument, but I notice that you introduced the idea of 'moral responsibility,' which is also a reason for Dennett's revision of free will.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com