tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21863552.post6067378156194129656..comments2023-11-25T01:52:56.999-08:00Comments on Philosophical Pontifications: Conceivability, Consciousness and the Content of BeliefAnonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06892913480992228908noreply@blogger.comBlogger1125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21863552.post-58181868427327336222012-08-20T13:30:59.861-07:002012-08-20T13:30:59.861-07:00"since it is unlikely that this would be so i..."<i>since it is unlikely that this would be so if Platonism could be <b>easily</b> established a priori from the platitude that there are true predications, I think Type-B Platonism is more plausible than Type-A Platonism</i>"<br /><br />Type-A views needn't hold that the a priori entailment is <i>easy</i> to see. Insofar as empirical contingencies are irrelevant to the dispute, we should think it (like most philosophy) a priori if knowable at all. But philosophy (like the other great a priori discipline: mathematics) needn't be <i>easy</i>.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.com